South Carolina Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 3

Article 8

Spring 2018

Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable: Artificial Intelligence
and the Challenges for Criminal Law
Dafni Lina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dafni Lima, Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable: Artificial Intelligence and the Challenges for
Criminal Law, 69 S. C. L. REV. 677 (2018).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.

Lina: Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable: Artificial Intelligenc

COULD AT AGENTS BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE? ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND THE CHALLENGES FOR CRIMINAL LAW

Dafni Lima*
I.

INTRODUCTION.............................................

II. WHAT'S IN AN ACT?

...............................................

III. REVISITING PERSONHOOD AND BLAME ...............

677

679

........... 684

IV. POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR ASCRIBING CRIMINAL LIABILITY................689

A.
B.
C.
D.

InstrumentalUse of an AI Agent.
...................
Negligence and Recklessness
...................
RespondeatSuperior?
.........................
Other Options: Direct Liability or Bad Luck .......

V.

FINAL THOUGHTS: CAN

I.

INTRODUCTION

Al AGENTS TRULY MURDER?

..... 690
....... 691
...... 692
.......... 693
.........

694

For the past few decades, artificial intelligence (AI) seemed like
something out of a science fiction work; the concept of a human-made
intellect that could gain sufficient autonomy in order to make its own,
independent choices is still quite unfamiliar for most. In recent years, rapid
technological development has led to products that have evolved to
increasingly incorporate Al elements. From smart products to drones to the
Internet of Things, social reality has advanced beyond what was
technologically feasible when relevant laws were drawn up and enacted.
Smart technical systems that can operate in the absence of constant human
input pose a set of questions particularly challenging for concepts salient for
criminal law and its application in practice.
While in the past Al applications have been used more and more broadly
in fields ranging from computer science to finance to medicine, we now stand
on the verge of the first major breakthrough in widespread application of Al
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in a way that is recognizable by the mass public: autonomous vehicles.' Smart
cars that can safely navigate traffic are hardly a fantasy anymore; they have
been in development for some years now, and the first versions are already on
the streets of major U.S. cities. In 2011, Nevada was the first state to allow
and regulate the operation of autonomous vehicles, and as of 2017, thirty-three
states have introduced legislation that is related to the issue; twenty of them
have already passed relevant legislation, and a further five have seen relevant
executive orders issued.2
Operation of autonomous vehicles comes with great advantages: it will
arguably increase mobility for social groups like the elderly or people with
disabilities, it will provide greater safety on the road by providing a more
restful travel for professional drivers and arguably guarantee increased
adherence to traffic laws, as well as allow drivers to be more productive when
travelling, as the autonomous car could take over for the most part. The future
of autonomous cars is still not entirely shaped as versions based on a varying
degree of automation are developed, some requiring a standby human driver
and others being fully autonomous, yet autonomous vehicles in general rely
heavily on Al in order to operate.
The advent of what seems to be the first mass application of Al in
everyday life and in particular one that tremendously affects transportationan essential human activity that is intensely regulated by law and where ample
opportunities can arise for criminal law to intervene will undoubtedly have
implications that will affect how criminal law is construed and how it is
applied. More than that, it will provide an invaluable opportunity to revisit
and reflect on traditional criminal law concepts such as personhood, harm,

&

1.
See Sven A. Beiker, LegalAspects ofAutonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1145 (2012); Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars-Oh My:
First Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem,16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619
(2015); Adeel Lari et al., Self-Driving Vehicles and Policy Implications: Current Status of
Autonomous Vehicle Development and Minnesota Policy Implications, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI.
TECH. 735 (2015), for an introduction to the subject. See also AUTONOMOUS DRIVING:
TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS (M. Maurer et al. eds., trans., Springer Nature 2016),
for several different perspectives into autonomous vehicles, including a social and historical
account. See Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly
Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423 (2012), for regulatory issues in
the U.S. context.
2.
See Self-Driving Vehicles, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx#E
nacted%/o20Autonomous%2OVehicle%20Legislation (last visited Feb. 24, 2018), for these
figures as well as further information on actions taken by the fifty states regarding autonomous
vehicles.
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and blame since it will introduce a new "agent" into the traditional agency
spectrum that is defined by capable human actors.
II.

WHAT'S IN AN ACT?

One of the first challenges that we encounter when we start to contemplate
Al with regard to criminal justice is the implications for one of the
fundamental concepts in criminal law: acting. Criminal law is defined by its
function as a response to a crime, which is construed across western
jurisdictions as an act.3 It is a well-established principle of modem criminal
law that only acts can incur criminal liability;4 not thoughts, beliefs, or
intentions alone. In both common law and civil law systems, the inquiry into
criminal liability starts at the essential level of acting: the concept is reflected
in actus reus in the first system and included in the German
Tatbestandsmifj3igkeitin the most prominent representative jurisdiction of the
latter' (which translates to "fulfillment of the elements of the offense," while
Tat itself means "act").
Although there exists no single, consistent definition that applies to all
western jurisdictions about what constitutes an act-or "conduct" in the case
of United States law under criminal law, the same aspects of acting keep
coming up in theory and in case law in different legal systems, which speaks
to their importance, regardless of whether they are ultimately adopted or not.
In the United States, for instance, the Model Penal Code defines criminal
liability as such: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is
based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act of which he is physically capable," 6 while under "General Definitions"
7
an act is defined as "bodily movement" (whether voluntary or not).
Furthermore, the act requirement is widely regarded as the most notable, or
perhaps the only, exception to the rule that substantive criminal law in the
United States is not regulated under constitutional law.8

3. See Markus D. Dubber, ComparativeCriminalLaw, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1288, 1320 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2008) (noting that western jurisdictions require an act to constitute criminal
liability).
4. Id
5. Id. at 1318.
6.

MODEL PENAL CODE

7.

Id § 1.13.

§ 2.01

(AM. LAW INST. 1962).

8.
MARKUS D. DUBBER & TATJANA HORNLE, CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 197 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
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In Germany, a leading jurisdiction in civil law, the prevailing opinion
among criminal law scholars is that an act has to be controllable by the actor
and "socially relevant" 9-in other words, it needs to convey social meaning.
An example of this would be, for instance, an act that refers, relates to, or is
directed at another person, not just oneself, as liberal theorists would propose
in line with John Stuart Mill's famous articulation of the Harm Principlethat power can only be exercised against someone's will in order to prevent
harm to others.1 0 Further to that, all western jurisdictions have incorporated
omission or failure to act into the concepts of acting or conduct. Without going
into too much detail, it seems that concepts like bodily movement (or failure
thereof) that are voluntary, extroversive, and socially meaningful in a way that
is relevant to criminal law are essential aspects of acting.
It is important to note here that when a perpetrator uses objects or tools
or machines to bring about the desired result, the crime is still considered the
perpetrator's acting. When the perpetrator takes advantage of sentient beings,
like animals, that do not possess the capacity to reason or fully grasp a
situation and the relevant legal implications, criminal law again regards the
person manipulating the sentient being as the one "acting." Even in cases of
human actors that do not possess full capacity, or alternatively, human actors
with full capacity who are forced or tricked into acting for the benefit of
another, criminal law often regards this as acting by the person "behind the
scenes," while the person who physically committed the act is regarded as a
mere instrument of the principal actor. For instance, the German Criminal
Code explicitly states under section 25 that a principal is someone who
"commits the offense himself or through another.""
Against this setting, artificial intelligence raises some extremely
interesting questions. First of all, it invites us to consider whether Al agents
are acting in the sense of criminal law. And secondly, it urges us to think about
different modes of acting when it comes to human agents. These are the two
sides of the same question, as an offense that is "committed" by an Al agent,
for example an autonomous vehicle running over and thus killing a person,
will have to be attributed to someone. Could it be attributed to the Al agent
in which case, we concede that the autonomous vehicle is acting? Should it be
attributed to the person behind the scenes-the driver that failed to regain
control or perhaps the designer that created an algorithm that allowed this

9.
Id. at 194.
10. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 17 (1859) ("That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.").
11. MICHAEL BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION 43 (Hart Publ'g 1st ed. 2008).
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development? Or should it be regarded as a product of luck, what would once
be referred to as "an act of God"-something that is not attributable to
anybody, that is caused by forces of nature or sheer bad luck? Or, finally,
should the rise of more and more complex Al agents invite us to reconsider
the mere notion of act as the bedrock of contemporary criminal law theory?
Will we perhaps need to replace or expand or enrich the arguably obsolete
notion of "voluntary bodily movement" against this new landscape?
These questions are far from easy and could hardly be fully answered in
the scope of this Paper. Instead, what is attempted here is to illuminate the
appropriate questions we need to ask in the face of these technological
developments, and thus illustrate which elements will lead criminal law
scholars and practitioners to different approaches according to how they
evolve in the future, as well as draw an outline of these different approaches.
It is also crucial to note that Al will pose challenges for criminal law theory
and judicial practice not only because it might invite us to think of
sophisticated Al agents as actors of crimes, but also because it introduces
further human actors in the query to attribute criminal liability: an Al agent
will be, both initially and in terms of how it learns from input and adapts,
dependent upon its design and programming, which necessarily includes
human agents such as its designers, programmers, and developers as relevant
actors. Al agents will also sometimes-or rather, almost always, in the current
stage of technological development interact with an operator, as well as
other human actors that they necessarily engage with-for example, with
other drivers, in the case of smart cars. All these individuals are "brought"
into the scene of the crime for questioning, forcing criminal law to make
difficult yet interesting decisions when ascribing liability.
Of course, the answer to these questions cannot be given without
knowledge of the answer to the most fundamental question of all: what is Al
and what is it capable of doing?' 2 Since Al is not one thing but is constantly
evolving, the answer-and with it, criminal law's response will hugely
depend upon the individual facts of the case at hand. An autonomous vehicle
that should at all times be supervised by a present, competent, and legally
licensed driver, 13 for example, is a totally different scenario than a fully
autonomous vehicle that drives a minor or a drunk person safely home. Yet

12. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 399, 404-05 (2017).
13. See Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by
Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1163 (2012) ("If legislators determine
they will require a licensed driver in the driver's seat, they must then decide whether to place
criminal responsibility on that driver for failing to respond to technological malfunctions.").
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criminal law needs to prepare for both these possibilities and provide tailored
responses.
In general, artificial intelligence is associated with the ability to adapt
according to the feedback received in order to solve problems and address
situations that go beyond the predefined set of queries and instructions that
the Al was programmed with. In essence, artificial intelligence mirrors the
human ability to process information and learn. As such, it can "decide" how
to respond to unprecedented scenarios and also "choose" how to navigate a
novel situation towards successfully achieving some objective. As Al
applications expand and humans become more comfortable with them, many
envision Al that will become truly independent from its human counterparts
and take on a life of its own.
Under the current state of development, it seems that Al actions could
hardly fall under the definition of acting.1 4 Even if we set aside as obsolete
the "bodily" dimension of acting, which by definition could never apply to a
machine, an intelligent agent's movements could neither be seen as "socially
relevant" nor as "voluntary" in the sense that criminal law implies. Social
relevance may be grounded in a specific historical context, but it is built over
time through evolution of social dynamics and perceptions," and Al agents
are still too young to have gathered such a "critical mass" of social meaning
and importance. This, however, may change in the future as individuals and
societies become more and more familiar with Al agents, especially service
robots that assimilate a human-like appearance.
As for voluntariness, this could be at first glance attributed to any agent
that "chooses" based on a given set of facts, so that even a computer choosing
one of two available options based on input and a set objective might be said
to choose. But on a deeper level, voluntariness, even in bodily movements, is
rooted in the ability for judgment and free will. That is why, for instance, a
person's bodily movement while sleepwalking or as a reflex does not count
as voluntary under criminal law,1 6 and this emphasis on the ability for
judgment is reflected even further in the context of blame and punishment.' 7

14. See Sabine Gless et al., If Robots Cause Harm, Who is to Blame? Self-Driving Cars
and CriminalLiability, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 412, 417 (2016).
15. For example, let us not forget that at one time even animals were put on criminal trial
and sentenced often to death. See, e.g., E. P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2009) (1906).
16.

See Thomas Weigend, Germany, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL

LAW 260 (Stanford Law Books 1st ed. 2010).
17. See generally Anthony Honor6, Causation in the Law, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation
-law (last updated Nov. 17, 2010).
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Voluntariness in this sense implies the ability to act otherwise, and an
agent that is programmed to choose A when it encounters B is not necessarily
choosing. Thus, Al agents do not yet seem to possess the potential for fully
independent, even self-destructive decisions. In other words, no one would
regard a robot's choice to change its route when stumbling upon a table as
voluntary, so long as the robot is simply following an algorithm, however
intricate, that dictates it to change route when encountering a physical
obstacle-or to put it more simply, so long as the robot does not have the
choice to keep hitting at the obstacle if it so wishes. This holds true even when
this choice is the only reasonable one and in the Al agent's "benefit" of
achieving its objective.
The way that we approach the problem of acting in the context of Al
agents will also determine the way we respond to the causality requirement
that is inherent in criminal law. It is widely accepted that no criminal liability
may arise for a result unless it is causally linked to an agent's conduct-in
simpler terms, unless the result was brought about due to the agent's conduct,
the agent is not considered the perpetrator of the act.
Causality or causation has been the subject of much debate in criminal
law theory,'" with approaches ranging from a focus on necessity (the "butfor" test and its variations) to sufficiency (such as the NESS test). A simple
example of causation would be the following: intending to bring about X's
death, I drop poison in their tea, whichXdrinks. The poison needs a few hours
to take effect and in the meantime, X is run over by a car while trying to cross
a busy street. As much as I wanted Xto be dead and as much as I tried to bring
about this desirable result, their death is not my doing. The chain of causation
has been broken by the reckless driver (or even the autonomous car) that
claimed X's life first. 19 But if the reckless driver merely injured Xby running
over them, and before dying from these injuries the poison took effect and
brought about X's death, then X's death is still my doing even though they
would have died anyway from the wounds sustained in the car accident.
Therefore, in order to break the causal link between a conduct and a harm,
there needs to exist an intervention significant enough to warrant such a split,
and this is usually the case in the event of forces of nature at play or

18. See generally MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 45
(2009); H.L.A. HART & ANTHONY HONORI, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 2002); MICHAEL
S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND
METAPHYSICS (2010); Jane Stapleton, Law, Causation andCommon Sense, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 111 (1988); Honor6, supra note 17.

19.

See R v. White [1910] 79 Crim. App. 854 at 856 (Eng.), for a variation of this example

which established the "but-for" test in English case law.
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involvement of third parties.20 There are several more sophisticated versions
of causation that are widely accepted. For example, if I plant a bomb in
someone's car with the intent to kill that person, but in order for the bomb to
go off the person needs to turn on the ignition and they do, then strictly
speaking it was the person's action that ultimately brought about their death.
Yet in such cases it is widely accepted that the result is still caused by the
original agent's doing and that the "intervening" act is not enough to break
the chain of causation 2' much in the same vein as in "perpetration by
another," the victim here is used instrumentally by the perpetrator. Similarly,
setting up a machine or a mechanism that will ultimately bring about the
harmful result even when the offender is not present is not sufficient to break
the causal relationship; the end result is still the offender's doing.
In this context, whether or not one regards an Al agent's actions as acting
in the criminal law sense is crucial for causation. If an Al agent is merely an
instrument at the hands of the human agent, much like an inanimate tool such
as a hammer or a knife, then the answer is simple. But matters become slightly
more complex when we conceive of Al that is complex enough to perceive a
situation and proceed with acting-or, fail to act where it could have acted
and thus allow the harmful result to come about. Yet whether or not we
understand the "choices" made by Al as acting is closely linked to how we
perceive other issues, such as the pivotal question of personhood.
III. REVISITING PERSONHOOD AND BLAME

Artificial intelligence by definition mimics one of the essential traits of
the human species, that of adapting to one's environment, and as such, it
invites us to revisit our understanding of personhood. 22 Personhood is a
concept that underlies not only criminal law, but every field of law, as it is
closely linked to our capacity to perform legally meaningful acts and bring
about legally relevant developments. Historically, our understanding of what
it means to be a person has been connected to human ability for self-reflection

20. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 429-30.
21. See, e.g., Rv. Pagett [1983] 76 Crim. App. 279 (Eng.); Rv. Roberts [1971] 56 Crim.
App. 95 (Eng.).
22. See generally, e.g., Bert-Jaap Koops et al., Bridging the Accountability Gap: Rights
for New Entities in the InformationSociety?, 11 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 497 (2010) (illustrating
a very thorough account of the debate with several further references); Kamil Muzyka, The
Outline ofPersonhoodLaw RegardingArtificial Intelligences andEmulated Human Entities, 4
J. ARTIFICIAL GEN. INTELLIGENCE 164 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor
ArtificialIntelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992) (discussing the broader issue of personhood
with regard to Al).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss3/8
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and self-conscience, 23 that is, our ability to perceive our independent existence
and its boundaries that stretch into the past and future. As things stand
currently, Al units do not seem to possess that same degree of self-awareness
(or any at all) that would allow us to consider their situation as equivalent to
the human experience-although this might change in the future. 24
On some level, personhood is also associated with our ability to set goals
for ourselves and pursue them, which for now seems to be extremely restricted
when it comes to Al agents. While they might possess the ability to scale and
set independent, smaller objectives in order to reach their overall goal, this
greater objective is still set by the human programmer or user (or even another
Al programmer or user that has been in turn initially developed by a human).
In the case of autonomous vehicles, for example, while the Al software might
be in a position to make decisions on the spot regarding traffic, the overall
goal of safely navigating to the occasional desired destination is
predetermined.
It would be an oversight not to note that there is truth in the statement that
our own humanly possible perception of our awareness and our degree of
freedom in setting our own goals and in making choices is far from complete.
Quite often there are factors at play that restrict our freedom and distort our
awareness, while philosophers and scientists are still contemplating on how
exactly we form our self-understanding and our conscience. Nonetheless,
there is an obvious qualitative difference between our own, at times fuzzy or
inexplicable, ability to self-reflect and an Al agent's shortcomings on the
same matter.
If an Al agent cannot be considered a person, it could not prima facie
enjoy rights and be bound by obligations as humans do. There is again a
qualitative difference between a restriction and an obligation, and while an Al
unit may be programmed to adhere to certain restrictions, so long as this
adherence is not the product of its own volition, it cannot be considered an
"obligation" as such. However, when we turn to the issue of rights, 25 things
slightly change; it is widely accepted that rights function quite differently than
obligations for subjects that are not considered capable of undertaking
obligations under law. For example, a minor can often enter into contracts that

23. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 415, for a fuller account.
24. Id. at 416.
25. "Rights" and "obligations" are used in a generalizing fashion in order to
accommodate the scope of this Paper. For a more nuanced understanding of rights and
obligations, as well as a starting point to consider more accurate descriptions of legal categories
that might better fit Al agents, see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions
as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 16-59 (1913).
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convey upon them benefits but not obligations, 26 or which are valid with
regard to rights conferred and void with regard to obligations. Lately, a lot has
been said on the issue of recognizing animal rights, 27 not least because we
have finally begun to understand that animals are sentient beings that
experience a much wider range of feelings than previously acknowledged; 28
as both research and legal scholarship advances on this matter, it might be
conceivable that certain developments might be suitable for transposing in the
field of Al agents with regard to their "rights" or "freedoms."
In the context of criminal law, personhood is closely associated with
blame, as only a person who can distinguish right from wrong and is in a
position to choose can be blamed for choosing to do wrong. 29 Blame
presupposes the ability to comprehend what each choice will entail and the
ability to freely choose. Historically, this goes beyond simply associating one
option with criminal law repercussions and the other with walking freealthough in practice it might very well be reduced to that. In that respect, it
must be noted that the focus of deterrence theories is precisely on simply
discouraging people from committing crimes, regardless of their inner
motives, while seminal legal positivist teachings 30 are in part dedicated to
freeing adherence to legal rules from the burden of inextricable association
with moral considerations.
Against this setting, it is important to note a sometimes overlooked aspect,
namely that mens rea and blame requirements were originally devised as a
safeguard against abuse of state power in the exercise of criminal law
enforcement; they were meant to ensure that no one would be held
accountable for a crime if the person was mentally unaware of what had
happened or did not engage in it with some degree of volition or acquiescence.
Anyone held criminally liable for a conduct should have had some level of

26. See, e.g., BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 107, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch bgb/englisch bgb.html#p0323 (Ger.).
27. See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS, CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R.
Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004); MARK ROWLANDS, ANIMAL RIGHTS, MORAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Palgrave Macmillan, 2d ed. 2009); Jessica Eisen & Kristen Stilt,
Protection and Status of Animals, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMP. CONST. LAW
(Rainer Grote et al. eds., 2015).
28. For example, in 2009, the EU with the Lisbon Treaty recognized that animals are
"sentient beings," building on its previous legacy of recognizing the Five Freedoms for animals
kept for farming purposes: "Freedom from hunger and thirst, Freedom from discomfort,
Freedom from pain, injury, and disease, Freedom to express normal behaviour, and Freedom
from fear and distress." Animal Welfare, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/food/
animals/welfare en (last updated Feb. 24, 2018).
29. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 419.
30. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, in CLARENDON L. SER., 167, 167-80 (Oxford
Univ. Press 3d ed. 2012).
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knowledge and intent (or the duty to have known and to take care to avoid)
with regard to the results of their actions.
This once groundbreaking development tapped into our collective innate
human ability to understand, pass moral judgment on, and manipulate our
actions. It also reflected a deep respect for human beings, as it treated them
on the basis of their informed choices; one would only suffer the consequences
for their actions because they chose so. This approach rests, on a deeper level,
on respect for the freedom to even act wrongly and inflict harm it is only
when one conscientiously makes that choice, that they will be punished. This
is why children, for instance, who do not yet fully apprehend the consequences
of their actions, or persons with mental health challenges that prevent them
from reasoning properly, are treated differently under criminal law.
Ultimately, criminal liability is a response reserved for those who could have
risen to the occasion but chose not to.
Again, this approach is arguably a shortcut; it casts aside any particularly
sophisticated concerns about how human intent is formulated as well as any
doubts about whether our free will is indeed free and our own after all. As law
so often does in general, this is both a generalization and a simplificationand one might even sense a hint of declaration captured in it.
In any case, the move away from torture, forced labor as punishment, and
capital punishment (for most of the Western world) equally mirrored respect
for a perpetrator's innate humanity; in principle, the law is not allowed to
touch a convict's body or take their life. Similarly, the general rule that a fair
and just trial by a judicial body is required before any imprisonment can
legitimately be imposed is again the result of respect for what it means to be
human. In that sense, it seems that modem criminal law and all its progressive
developments were designed by humans for humans and always revolved
around the fact that we all share some innately human quality that needs to be
respected even in our ugliest hour. Of course, this progressive undercurrent is
not without exceptions or occasional regress, but it lies at the heart of modem
criminal law theory and practice.
At the time of this development in criminal law theory, only human agents
possessed this type of intellect that forms the basis of criminal liability.
Animals, although they do have the ability to communicate and make
qualified choices to some extent, do not possess the same level of ability to
understand or choose between right and wrong-or, in any case, between what
the law prohibits and what it allows or demands.
Legal persons, on the other hand, which are the sole prominent example
of extending criminal liability beyond human actors, are still based on human
agency. First, they are in essence legal fictions, a translation of our collective
efforts into legally relevant terms, and as such are not endowed with any type
of intellect-although there is something to be said about corporate culture
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and the way a collective agent can over time establish mechanisms and
processes that surpass its individual members. Yet in contrast to animals,
which are clearly something radically different from humans but do not have
the same legally relevant capabilities, corporations caught the eye of criminal
law precisely because they are so closely entwined with human agents.
Corporations are made up by humans who sometimes deliberately use
them to escape responsibility for criminal conduct, and this is part of the
reason why criminal law in many jurisdictions has stepped in and introduced
some form of "criminal liability" for legal persons. Yet there is something to
be said for the fact that, in many jurisdictions, legal persons are not subject to
criminal penalties, but only administrative sanctions, 31 precisely because
criminal law cannot concern itself with agents that cannot make moral
decisions and thus cannot be blamed.32
Artificial intelligence is completely different from both animals and legal
persons. It is not alive, like animals, yet it is not simply a fiction, like
corporations. Yet it could be conceived of existing (at least after its initial
creation) independently and without the involvement of humans and it could
reason, which sets it apart from both legal persons in the first respect and from
animals in the latter. Ultimately, it is an open question whether Al might in
the future develop a form of conscience and even the capacity for ethics and
reasoning that might allow it to be subjected to blame on par with human
agentS 33 which is not the case with legal persons or animals. But as long as
both our understanding and the practicality of blame are associated with selfawareness and conscious decisions rooted in the human experience, Al agents
cannot partake.
The same point could be made about punishment. Even though we could
conceive of punishments for Al agents that are roughly "equivalent" to those
for humans, 34 there is still an argument to be made that these equivalent

31. Weigend, supra note 16, at 266.
32. Id.; see also Gless et al., supra note 14, at 416-17; Thomas Weigend, Societas
DelinquereNon Potest?:A German Perspective, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 927, 936 (furthering the
argument that corporations cannot act, be blamed, or be punished).
33. See generally WENDELL WALLACH & COLLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES:
TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 9-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (furthering the

fascinating subject of robots, ethics, and morals); Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Keeping AI
Legal, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133, 133 (2016) (arguing about the dangers Al might pose
for legal order).
34. See Gabriel Hallevy, I, Robot- I, Criminal- Wen Science Fiction Becomes Reality:
Legal Liability ofAIRobots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP.
1, 29-35 (2010) (theorizing punishment adjustments for Al robots).
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sanctions are slightly beside the point. All major theories about punishment,35
from retributivism to rehabilitation (save perhaps for specific deterrence), 3 6
presuppose a communicative aspect3 7 among agents that in theory participate
equally in a shared experience of the world and in awareness of their own and
each other's existence. Punishment is a collective means of responding to
crime directed at an agent that can understand its significance as well as its
relevance to their criminal conduct38 which is why people with diminished
capacity are, as a rule, not subject to criminal sanctions.
If an Al software were deleted as a form of capital punishment, would
anyone say that "it got what it deserved" in the context of the "just deserts"
approach? And if it was deactivated for a certain period of time, could we
truly hope that other Al units would be deterred from engaging in similar
conduct? Until a positive answer to at least one of these questions appears
likely, debate about criminal punishment for Al agents seems somewhat
misplaced.
IV. POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR ASCRIBING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In the case where a result is brought about by an "action" (or "omission")
on part of an Al agent, then an inquiry about ascribing criminal liability arises.
The answer to how and if-criminal liability should be attributed will
heavily depend on the circumstances of each case, as outlined below. In each
of these cases, approaches and concepts already familiar to criminal law might
offer the solution; however, the focus will shift to the way legal professionals,
lawmakers, judges, and practitioners will adapt, enrich, or decide to firmly
hold on to their current understandings of these concepts.

&

35. See generally OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, A READER ON PUNISHMENT (Antony Duff
David Garland eds., 1994); OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A
FUTURE? (Michael Tonry ed., 2011); R. A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY
AND LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW (Hart Publ'g ed. 2007) (resources discussing different
&

theories of punishment).
36. See generally Joshua Dressler, Deterrence, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
JUSTICE 507, 507-14 (Thomas J. Bernard et al. eds., 2002).
37. For a discussion on the communicative aspect of punishment, see generally R.A.
DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2001); JOEL
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95-118
(Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1970); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 6-19

(Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1996).
38. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 421-22.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8
690

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

A.

[VOL. 69: 677

Instrumental Use ofan AIAgent

The first and easiest scenario is quite straightforward: what if a human
actor manipulates an Al agent into doing the human's bidding, with the intent
to commit a particular crime? In such cases, the obvious solution is to hold
the person manipulating the Al agent accountable. This could be a
programmer that successfully inserts an algorithm designed to kill into Al
software or an operator that instructs Al software so that it will inflict harm to
others. In any case, the Al agent cannot be regarded as anything else but a tool
in the hands of the human "behind the curtain."
However, the path by which to ascribe liability might differ according to
the level of sophistication that the Al agent possesses. In the case of tools like
a hammer, for example, we are never speaking of "ascribing" the action of the
hammer to the human using it the movement of the tool is immediately
understood as the action of the human agent. In the case of animals, we often
equate them in legal terms with things that can be manipulated by their master
(although they could never be controlled in an absolute sense, like a tool). In
both these cases, we regard the human actor as the perpetrator of the criminal
act.
Things start to change when we encounter the possibility of a human
using another human as a "means" to commit a crime. In these cases, for
example when an individual is tricked in order to shoot at someone thinking
that the individual was only shooting at an inanimate target or when a nurse
is tricked into giving poison to a patient thinking they were only administering
a medicine, we could talk of perpetration by another. Yet this approach
commands the existence of an intermediary (the "another") who is, in theory,
in a position to intervene as the events that constitute the criminal conduct
unfold a person who could understand what is going on or who, in any case,
could choose to act otherwise. If this is not the case, we would not talk about
perpetration by another but simply about "perpetration," as we do with
animals. "Another" is a direct reference to "another human."
In order, then, for this theory to make sense in the context of Al agents,
they should be sophisticated and intricate enough to have the capability to
understand what was going on and to choose accordingly even if in the end
they were tricked into the desired conduct by the perpetrator behind the
scenes. One could argue that an autonomous vehicle that was simply
programmed to go on the street and run over people is quite a different
scenario than a driver who manipulates an Al car into regarding a particular
person as a mere object they can safely run over. One could even begin to feel
the "pull" of an ethical condemnation against the human actor in the second
case, as an (artificially) intelligent agent is manipulated into committing a
harmful action it would otherwise never choose to do. Ultimately, it all
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depends on whether technological progress will allow us to view Al agents as
sufficiently human-like or not.
At this point, it is also interesting to note that there are cases that might
occur where an Al agent goes beyond the originally intended criminal act. For
example, an autonomous vehicle is programmed to go out and injure a human,
but instead ends up killing the human. In those cases, the end result is
something different than the human actor has intended, and the theory of
ascribing liability based on the foreseeability and probability of the crime that
was actually committed as a consequence of the intended criminal conduct
might prove useful.3 9
This model is usually employed when ascribing liability to an accomplice
or an instigator and is based on a type of negligence on part of the accomplice
or instigator. Under this model, criminal liability is ascribed to an accomplice
or an instigator when they could and should have foreseen the different result
that came about as a probable consequence of the initially intended act. Thus,
in our example, the human actor could be held liable if the killing was a
probable and foreseeable consequence of the human's order to the
autonomous vehicle to go out and injure a particular person.40 If, however, the
crime ultimately committed had nothing to do with the one intended (e.g., a
robot is ordered to steal a letter and instead bums down a house), then the
perpetrator behind the scenes cannot be held criminally liable.
B. Negligence andRecklessness
On a similar note, negligence is the model that most fittingly can be used
to ascribe criminal liability for unintended conduct that occurs in the context
of an Al agent's usual programming or use-that is, as it carries out its duties
without malfunction. Here, the focus shifts on a benevolent designer or
operator who neglected to take due care in order to prevent an undesirable
outcome that could occur within the usual performance of the Al agent and
which the programmer or user should have foreseen. In these cases, the Al
agent functions appropriately and in the discharge of its duties commits a
crime-a simple example would be a cleaning robot that destroys valuable
property mistaking it for dirt. 41

39. Hallevy, supra note 34, at 4.
40. See generally IRYNA MARCHUK, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF CRIME IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 167-98 (2014) (discussing
the concept of joint criminal enterprise under international criminal law and its origins).
41. Gless et al., supra note 14, at 423 (discussing negligence that results in bodily injury).
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In such cases, the main question to be answered is whether the
programmer or the user could have foreseen this development and whether
they were in a position to act in order to prevent it. Negligence, in essence,
revolves around the duty to take appropriate and reasonable care to prevent
harm to others and focuses on the foreseeability of the undesirable outcome.42
In cases where the human agent actually foresaw the outcome and decided to
disregard it-and according to the jurisdiction-recklessness would be the
appropriate model to ascribe liability.
C. Respondeat Superior?
Strict liability is not unheard of in criminal law, but it stands in stark
tension with many of its underlying principles-some of which, regarding free
will and the innately human capacity to make (even wrongful) decisions, were
discussed above. Yet in many western jurisdictions, strict liability offenses
exist, from drug possession to particularly minor offenses like driving
infractions. The concept of vicarious liability (or, in very fitting to the theme
at hand terms, of respondeat superior "let the master answer")4 3 derives
mainly from tort law, where it is particularly applied to impose liability on a
person in control of another (such as an employer with regard to an employee)
for the wrongdoing of their agent.44
This relationship between an agent and a superior appears at first uniquely
suitable to the situation at hand. Just like with Al agents, in the case of
vicarious liability, the agent that committed the wrongdoing is an
independently intelligent and capable one. However, the concept is radically
transformed when transposed in criminal law and for good reason. One
cannot tolerate the same low threshold of intellectual and volitional
involvement for the obligation to undertake responsibility for a tort and for a

42. Id. at 423-24 (discussing negligence more generally in the context of Al agents).
43. Id. at 416.
44. See id. at 414 (discussing damages caused by Al agents); see generally Sophia H.
Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future ofAutonomous Car Liability, 16
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453 (2013) (explaining how applying a strict liability regime for
autonomous cars will equitably assess liability without unduly hindering innovation); Kyle
Graham, Of FrightenedHorses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of
Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2012) (discussing the uncertainty in predicting
the interplay of innovation and liability in the context of autonomous cars); Gary E. Marchant
& Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability
System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321 (2012) (discussing how autonomous cars will reduce
the number of vehicular accidents yet still pose liability concerns for manufacturers); Matthew
U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and
Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 354 (2016) (advocating for the application of a tort system
as opposed to direct regulation of autonomous vehicles).
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crime. Criminal law is typically associated with grave consequences for the
one found to bear liability, so the threshold must be higher.
This point has also a more general insight to offer: any potential model of
ascribing liability for the human agent who is somehow involved in a crime
committed by an Al agent will have to vary not only depending on
circumstances, such as the sophistication of the intelligence of the Al agent or
the degree of control of the human agent, but also on the type of crime
committed. In other words, the threshold should be higher for serious crimes,
such as killing, and could be lower for relatively minor ones, such as the
destruction of an inexpensive item that belongs to a third party.
In the case of strict liability, not only is our deeper understanding of what
criminal law is and what it does at stake, but also different and competing
policy concerns. Introducing strict liability might satisfy a social demand for
accountability that could prove crucial in the acceptance and wider use of Al
agents; on the other hand, it could undermine the potential to further develop
Al applications because the designers or operators would be discouraged by
the likelihood of being found criminally liable for acts they did not intend or
concede to.45 In this context, strict liability could either be reserved only for
minor offenses when they fall within the margin of error on the part of the
human agent, whether it is a programming or an operating error, or it could be
discarded completely as a model for ascribing criminal liability. Perhaps the
best way to consider strict liability is in a context where it is combined with
negligence requirements, in an approach modeled after (criminal) liability for
faulty products.

D.

46

Other Options: DirectLiability or Bad Luck

Even if everything is done properly on the part of human agents, an Al
agent might still malfunction and thus cause harm. In these cases, no human
is at fault, and the question of what to do with criminal liability remains open.
Another important and extreme scenario to consider is when an Al agent
"deliberately" inflicts harm.
The second scenario seems far-fetched for now. As Al is not yet at a stage
where it could really choose to do wrong, as discussed above, imposing direct
criminal liability should be ruled out. 47 If and when Al sufficiently develops

45. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 432-33.
46. See id. at 425-3 1. But cf Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD.
L. REv. 785, 811-32 (2015) (arguing the Federal Trade Commission is the appropriate authority
for regulating robots).
47. But see Hallevy, supra note 34, at 19.
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to conform to some of the criteria set out above, then this question might be
reconsidered. Even in those cases, however, a malfunction cannot be blamed
on an Al agent any more than acts performed while intoxicated can be blamed
on a human agent. 48

In such cases of malfunction, it is proposed that humans should learn to
live with this unfortunate development, much in the same vein that they have
learned to live with the results of a bridge collapsing due to a hurricane or a
flat tire that leads to a car accident. 49 Not everything can be foreseen,
prevented, or contained, and in everyday life there are several instances where
no one is to blame-much more be held criminally liable-for an undesirable
outcome. In other words, not everything can or should be regulated under
criminal law. Depending on the familiarity that humans will develop with Al
agents in the future, this option might prove to be a viable alternative to
criminal liability, even though policy implications have to be considered as it
is likely that Al acceptance rates might suffer at first."o
V.

FINAL THOUGHTS: CAN Al AGENTS TRULY MURDER?

Artificial intelligence and its development in the next years will
undoubtedly pose great challenges for criminal law, which go beyond the
question of criminal liability. With new technology and a far more widespread
use of Al agents than is currently conceivable, new opportunities for crime
will arise. For instance, if autonomous vehicles become commonplace on our
streets, we will sooner or later need to think about new types of crimes that
could be committed by hackers and how to prevent the commission of
terrorism offenses that could be perpetrated by using the extended capabilities
of smart cars."' Furthermore, new legal rules will have to be devised to
regulate safe driving and relevant crimes;5 2 the relationship between an
autonomous vehicle, its driver and passengers, and third parties (other drivers,

48. See generally Hallevy, supra note 34, at 23-27 (discussing the applicability of
defenses for Al robots).
49. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 19 (arguing that Al agents should be viewed as "an
exceptional risk" as opposed to a "normal risk").
50. See Gless et al., supra note 14, at 430-31.
51. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 13, at 1164-68 (discussing the implications of
autonomous vehicles being used in the perpetration of criminal activity or terrorism).
52. See generally Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving Into the Unknown: Examining the
Crossroads of Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 393
(2015) (explaining the need for federal and state regulators to amend automobile criminal laws
to aid the introduction of autonomous vehicles into society).
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passengers, or pedestrians); insurance and tort claims; 53 and privacy with
regard to autonomous vehicles. 54 Finally, law enforcement will have to be
equipped with new powers and duties in order to address the new situation;
for example, we will need to think about under which circumstances a law
enforcement officer might be allowed to pull over an autonomous vehicle, and
how.55

However, the very first wave of vibrations that will be felt in criminal law
will undoubtedly include issues that revolve around criminal liability. In this
context, legal professionals will be invited to revisit, enrich, and reshape
fundamental concepts, as discussed above. Lawmakers and common law
judges will have to come up with models that adequately address allocation
and imposition of criminal liability, practitioners and adjudicators will have
to understand how to best apply them in practice, and research by legal
scholars will have to shift focus in order to inform this debate. The results
might be as groundbreaking as Al technology itself; these reforms might even
one day lead us to reconsider the very foundations of criminal liability,
wrongful acts, and blame.
There exist among legal scholars opinions already in favor of imposition
of criminal liability on Al agents. 56 Yet similar suggestions seem to rely, at
least with regard to how things currently stand, on a circular argument that
begs the question. They appear to take for granted the axiom that Al agents
can fulfill the requirements for mens rea, even though mens rea as a concept
was clearly conceived with human agents in mind including criminal
liability of legal persons, since these are no more than collective enterprises
made up of human agents, in which case the criminal liability claim rests on
the law's inability to "pierce the veil" and ascribe liability to the human behind
the corporate fiction, as explained above.
Yet Al is something completely different. It is certainly no fiction
anymore but independent and potentially able to become fully autonomous. If
it is to be handled with legal tools that were devised for humans, we must

53. See generally Robert W. Peterson, New Technology-Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles
and California'sInsuranceFramework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1341 (2012).
54. See generally Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1171 (2012) (discussing the challenges of reconciling privacy concerns with
autonomous vehicle technology and suggesting some solutions); Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Driving
into the DigitalAge: How SDVs Will Change the Law andIts Enforcement, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 827, 833-41 (2015) (discussing how autonomous vehicles will contain information that
the Supreme Court has held in other contexts to be protected by the Fourth Amendment).
55. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 13, at 1167-68.
56. See Hallevy, supra note 34, at 35-37; see generally GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN
ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW (2013) (providing an
elaborate account in favor of criminal liability of Al agents).
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establish either that it is sufficiently human-like, which does not yet seem to
be the case, or that the tools at hand are also suitable for non-humans, which
especially in the case of mens rea and blame is, at the very least, a matter of
dispute, as the whole concept reflects our collective experience of what it
means to be human.
So, taking for granted that mens rea requirements could aptly be fulfilled
by non-human (or, rather, non-human-like) intelligent agents necessarily
presupposes the perception of historically and empirically informed concepts
such as choice, voluntariness, knowledge, and intent as simply technical terms
without any inextricable grounding in the human experience. This is a bold
and perhaps forward-looking approach, but one that cannot be taken as selfevident without first examining those perspectives that would work against
it-some of which this Paper has attempted to articulate.
If current criminal law concepts were devised for those sharing in the
human experience of the world and its ethical dilemmas, and if the way Al
agents experience the world is not (yet) at that point, then what is there left to
do with criminal liability? It is important to note that even though artificial
intelligence is still not at the same level of capacity for intellectual and
emotional investment as humans, it may very well one day be-as countless
works of science fiction have been trying to warn us. If and when that day
comes, the situation might be very different with regard to criminal law and
its application to Al agents. On that day, we may be prepared to directly
ascribe criminal liability to Al actors and regard them as equally capable of
making ethically informed choices and committing wrongdoing we might
even invite each other to share in the legislative and judicial process of
responding to crime.
But until then, criminal law might not be the appropriate vessel for
holding Al agents accountable. Although criminal law carries with it a
connotation of moral condemnation that is very much socially desired in
situations of harm to others, especially in serious crimes such as bodily injury
or killing, a softer version of the State's powers to prohibit and punish
behavior might be more appropriate-for example, administrative sanctions
or a whole new field of law in-between. The desire to call a sanction
"criminal" and as such satisfy the need to respond to an undesirable conduct
by the gravity and resolution that criminal law means carry with them, bears
a hidden yet crucial danger. Instead of strengthening our response to harmful
and wrongful behavior, it might just weaken our perception of what criminal
law is and what it has the power to do, and thus qualify it with a degree of
levity that will in turn allow us to underestimate its potential to inflict harm
on humans and sap our vigilance with regard to its advances.
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